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 CHAPTER 5 
 During wars and confl icts, state bodies can assume unprecedented levels of 
power. By declaring states of emergency under the aegis of protecting their 
citizens, governments can acquire discretionary powers that impinge upon 
personal privacy, resort to actions that would normally be deemed unac-
ceptable during peace-time and allow political opponents to be detained, 
often without trial. 1 Inevitably, this works unfavourably for politicised pris-
oners. War breeds hatred and contempt which is often refl ected in severe 
institutional treatment. In such circumstances, hunger striking can be 
exceptionally common. Physical and emotional violence suffered in pris-
ons encourages a desire to reassert bodily autonomy. In turn, the broader 
context of war allows governments to reaffi rm their conviction that hun-
ger strikers form part of a group that poses a threat to socio- political order. 
In wartime, hunger striking takes place in the face of powerful discourses 
on the danger seemingly posed by political dissidents to the safety of the 
nation. Acts such as force-feeding help to reinforce the sovereignty of 
the state on a physical and metaphorical level. When performing the pro-
cedure, prison doctors help to re-establish prison order but also overtly 
contribute to the broader political project of protecting national security. 
To worsen matters even further for hunger strikers, media coverage can be 
censored, interpersonal violence can be justifi ed by the exigencies of war, 
and prisoners can be easily denounced as enemies of the state at times of 
patriotic fervour. In a frenzy of panic over ‘terror’ and enemy threats, the 
public is discouraged from caring about the plight of disruptive prisoners. 
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OPEN
This chapter focuses on the experiences of conscientious objectors in First 
World War England. After 1917, force-feeding was no longer resorted to 
in Ireland. However, force-feeding policies remained in place in England. 
During the First World War, politicised prisoners, while hunger striking, 
were exposed to harrowing levels of institutional violence and brutal-
ity. Their subversive ideas seemed to threaten national order, a problem 
that bred contempt between staff and prisoners. Conscientious objectors 
sought peace in an era of heightened patriotism. 
 Somewhat paradoxically, wartime hunger strikers are often adept at 
drawing public attention to unacceptable institutional conditions. While 
imprisoned, politicised prisoners can do little to challenge the govern-
ment that has incarcerated them. But wars end and opportunities arise to 
speak out. This was certainly the case for First World War conscientious 
objectors. In the 1920s, exposure to disproportionate violence and suf-
fering encouraged many of them to campaign for prison reform. Some 
brought considerable change to the prison system. Deaths from starva-
tion and brutal force-feedings buttressed the broader claim that early 
twentieth- century prisons were beset with problems; that the disciplinary 
functions of these sites were excessive and unjust. Prisons, by their very 
nature, are enigmatic sites. The disciplinary regimes enacted within them 
on the bodies of prisoners are mostly hidden from public view. However, 
politicised prisoners are often skilled at gathering support for prisoner 
welfare concerns. Upon release, they prove remarkably vocal about their 
institutional experiences. As Martin J. Weiner suggests, politicised pris-
oners tend to feel extremely alienated from authority and are particularly 
sensitive to mistreatment. Many are highly articulate. 2 They are able to 
convey details of prison life in a way that the majority of convict prisoners 
cannot. Many are educated and communicate their memories eloquently 
and fl uently. Through their writings and campaigning, they bring to light 
conditions that normally remain hidden from public view. In turn, tales 
of excessive suffering jar with public sensitivities towards pain and tor-
ture, sparking debate about governmental support of dismal institutional 
conditions, unethical behaviour, and inhumane treatment. The rational 
political logic of protecting national security can certainly lend support 
to mass internment or wartime imprisonment, as well as the claim that 
hunger strikers infl ict death upon themselves. But, the emotional econo-
mies of western societies provide a counterbalance. Suffering, after all, is 
something which the barbaric enemy supposedly enacts. It holds no place 
in a society battling to maintain its values of humanity and decency. When 
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investigating the relationship between governments and hunger strikers, 
historians have regularly outlined the complexities of political manoeu-
vrings. 3 However hunger strikes have rarely been contextualised in rela-
tion to ideas about the body, pain, and emotions. A distinct emotional 
script exists in the public sphere that counters the rational logic adopted 
by governments in tackling hunger strikes at times of crisis, a world of 
feeling that condemns actions such as force-feeding that seem to contra-
dict western sensibilities on suffering. 4 
 In recent years, an outfl owing of best-selling autobiographical litera-
ture from released Guantánamo detainees testifi es to the high interest in 
the plight of prisoners considered to be treated unfairly during the ‘war 
on terror’. 5 Hunger strikers fi nd ways to publicly challenge the govern-
ments that mistreat them. While support for radical religious extremism is 
limited in the west, enthusiasm for anti-terror measures and military inter-
vention in Islamic countries is far from universal. A humanitarian narrative 
exists that has called into question the capacity of the state to detain indi-
viduals and use doctors to force-feed. An inherent tension exists between 
the rational political logic of imposing punishment at times of crisis to help 
maintain socio-political order and the emotions involved in sympathising 
with prisoners imagined to be in pain. Indeed, the stories told by released 
Guantánamo detainees have inspired considerable opposition to the feed-
ing methods currently being used in the name of the ‘war on terror’. 6 
 FORCE-FEEDING CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS 
 During the First World War, large numbers of conscientious objectors 
refused to fi ght. In Britain, many accepted civilian work or service in non- 
combatant Corps. A small, but vocal, group of absolutists refused to com-
promise. These individuals had been conscripted and classifi ed as soldiers 
but refused to perform military service. They found themselves in a recur-
rent cycle of being court-martialled, imprisoned, and released. While in 
prison, they disobeyed institutional rules on the grounds of conscience 
and, emulating militant suffragettes and Irish republicans, actively sought 
to undermine the prison system. 7 David Boulton estimates that, in total, 
1543 conscientious objectors served sentences in English prisons. 8 While 
incarcerated, they faced extraordinary levels of contempt and physical vio-
lence. They had objected to confl ict at a time when the state and much of 
the population supported war. Their harshest critics dismissively portrayed 
them as degenerate, effeminate, and unhealthy, not to mention inherently 
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dangerous. Their refusal to fi ght threatened to jeopardise the national war 
effort. 9 
 Faced with antagonism, violence, and deplorable living conditions, 
many conscientious objectors went on hunger strike. Prison doctors force- 
fed them brutally. A considerable number of hunger strikers quickly capit-
ulated. When Wandsworth Prison’s medical offi cer, James Pitcairn, tried 
to feed one conscientious objector, the stomach tube ‘proved disagree-
able’. Writhing in pain, the prisoner swiftly resumed eating. 10 Nonetheless, 
others unwaveringly endured remarkably long periods of being fed against 
their will. In 1917, Joseph Garstand was force-fed for thirteen days. In 
the same year, J.W.  Illingworth endured forty-fi ve days of being fed in 
Birmingham. Between 1917 and 1918, prison doctors fed Frank Higgins 
twenty-two times in Newcastle, followed by a longer period of sixty-three 
days. 11 The infl iction of suffering upon men with peaceful, pacifi stic ten-
dencies aroused an emotional public response, demonstrating that public 
sensibilities towards needless violence could co-exist with support for the 
war effort. Although intense animosity was felt towards men who refused 
to fi ght, a perceptible unease emerged towards using excessive force on 
peaceful prisoners. The exigencies of war provided state bodies and prison 
offi cials with a rationale for supporting, or turning a blind eye to, physical 
and psychological intimidation, particularly when directed at seemingly 
contemptuous individuals. However prisons were no longer meant to be 
sites of pain, violence, and brutality. In theory, prisons were now intended 
to rehabilitate, not engage in relentless disciplining. 
 In light of this confl icting opinion, the plight of conscientious objec-
tors attracted the attention of sections of left-wing newspapers, most 
notably those which had denounced force-feeding during the recent suf-
fragette hunger strike campaign. Circumventing wartime censorship, the 
 Manchester Guardian regularly published (necessarily objective) reports 
on the predicament of conscientious objectors such as Manchester silver 
engraver, Emmanuel Ribeiro. In January 1917, Emmanuel was court- 
martialled for refusing to undertake military service. He found himself 
removed to military barracks in Bury where he went on hunger strike. 
Emmanuel was then transported to a military hospital in nearby Warrington 
and force-fed for seventeen months. Six months into Emmanuel’s feed-
ings, James MacPherson, Under-Secretary of State for War, stated in the 
House of Commons that Emmanuel was not resisting the prison doctors. 
The feedings were in no way ‘forceful’, he suggested, because Emmanuel 
was compliant. 12 Contradictory accounts, published in the  Manchester 
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Guardian , suggested that Emmanuel’s feedings were in fact painful and 
deeply degrading. In July, Constance Lytton contacted Emmanuel’s wife 
asking if he had sent any personal accounts from the prison. Emmanuel 
had. In these, he claimed that he had actively resisted the prison doctors 
for the fi rst three months. He wrote:
 They force a gag into my mouth which causes terrible pain. Then a tube was 
put in the mouth and forced into my stomach … with six men holding me 
down from moving. On Tuesday … I resisted after falling on the ground; 
they, with all hands holding me on the ground, forcibly-fed me there. 
This I say is scandalous. It is not only inhuman but barbarous torture of the 
worst kind. 
 In his mournful letters, Emmanuel portrayed a system of institutional 
intimidation intent on violently ending his protest. He portrayed force- 
feeding as a daunting encounter with a vast network of medical, insti-
tutional, and military power determined to bring his errant behaviour 
(or viewpoints) into line by forcing food into his gullet. Emily Lutyens, 
Lytton’s sister, argued in the  Manchester Guardian that ‘apart from the 
question of humanity, it would seem to be a waste of the manhood of the 
nation in this time of war to employ six able-bodied men to torture one 
defenceless man.’ 13 But using military manpower to undermine a pro-
test undertaken by a single individual served symbolic purposes. Exerting 
power and authority over one conscientious objector allowed the state to 
make visible its determination to maintain social and institutional order, 
uphold the authority of its conscription Acts, and deter like-minded indi-
viduals from refusing to fi ght. It set a strong example to others on the 
need for national solidarity at a time of international crisis. 
 In February 1918, a friend obtained permission to visit Emmanuel. By 
this stage, Emmanuel had been force-fed for thirteen months. He reported 
to the  Manchester Guardian that:
 Ribeiro was forcibly-fed during our visit but we were not allowed to witness 
the process, although we saw the tube brought in. It was over in a few min-
utes, and when we returned he was ill and giddy from the effect of the treat-
ment. He was evidently suffering with very strong movements of the heart. 
He pressed his hand hard on his left breast, seemed pale and exhausted, and 
for a time could only speak with diffi culty … I consider that the condition of 
Ribeiro is alarming, his health being much worse than when I last saw him. 
I fear he will die if not quickly liberated. 
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 This statement encouraged readers to empathise with Emmanuel by 
 detailing a gradual breakdown brought on by having a stomach tube 
involuntarily forced deep into his body. Force-feeding was portrayed as 
physically and emotionally exhausting; as a procedure that debilitated, 
rather than restored, the health of starving prisoners. On the basis of this 
account, conscientious objector, physician, and Labour politician, Alfred 
Salter, asserted that ‘the authorities know that he will never be in a fi t state 
of health to be court-martialled yet still they continue their persecution 
of him rather than discharge him.’ 14 Five months later, the  Manchester 
Guardian subtly reported that ‘Emmanuel Ribeiro, the Manchester con-
scientious objector, who has been on hunger-strike for seventeen months, 
has been released from Wormwood Scrubs Prison owing to the serious con-
dition of his health’, adding that ‘it was time’. 15 Emmanuel’s force-feeding 
was an overtly political act supported by a wartime state that clashed with 
public sensitivities towards pain, medical ethics, and institutional norms. 
However objectionable refusing to fi ght might have seemed, performing 
force-feeding for over a year appeared morally problematic and somewhat 
futile. If anything, it seemed to highlight the state’s inherent vindictive-
ness. For such reasons, Emmanuel amassed support from eminent indi-
viduals, including Constance Lytton. The ethical discussion that ensued 
about Emmanuel’s force-feeding shared similarities with earlier debates 
on the plight of hunger striking suffragettes. Yet the broader context of 
war in which conscientious objectors staged hunger strikes meant greater 
exposure to antagonism, resentment, hostility, and violence. The force-fed 
body of a male conscientious objector held less political currency than that 
of a female suffragette body, particularly when damage and harm had been 
infl icted upon it to support the popular wartime cause. 
 The experiences of other conscientious objectors held in military 
prisons further demonstrate that war amplifi ed the viciousness of prison 
encounters. In 1917, conscientious objector, Clarence Henry Norman, 
prosecuted Lieutenant Reginald Brooke for unlawful assault. The 
 Manchester Guardian reported on the proceedings. Henry alleged that he 
had been spat on, placed in a strait-jacket, verbally abused, and force-fed at 
Wandsworth Detention Barracks. He had initially been detained for refus-
ing to submit to a medical examination or put on a military uniform. The 
lieutenant defended his belligerence by claiming that he had no option 
but to place Henry in a strait-jacket. The prisoner was clearly suicidal, 
having announced his intention to die from hunger and thirst. During his 
multiple feedings, Brooke aggressively yelled ‘coward’, ‘swine’, ‘beast’, 
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and ‘sham conscientious objector’. Verbal abuse had been necessary, the 
lieutenant insisted, as Henry was a coward, not a conscientious objector. 
He fully deserved every word of the strong language uttered to him. 16 
 In the following year, another conscientious objector, imprisoned at 
Newcastle, was reportedly forced to his cell fl oor and held down by several 
offi cers to have a feeding tube forced through his nose so violently that it 
caused intense bleeding. The prison doctor sat laughing at the prisoner, 
taunting him by imitating his moans and cries. The incident was discussed 
in the House of Commons. 17 The few accounts that entered the public 
domain demonstrate the extremities of violence directed towards hun-
ger striking conscientious objectors. War could be used to justify verbal 
intimidation, unwarranted intrusions in the inner body, and psychological 
humiliation. Conscientious objectors were made to suffer as they posed a 
national threat. Such assaults embodied the exertion of sovereign power 
onto the bodies of those deemed too cowardly to fi ght. 
 Even death was of little consequence. Censorship could be used to hide 
details from the public; prison doctors could deny responsibility while 
feeling little remorse over the death of a traitor to the nation. The pass-
ing away of a conscientious objector did not carry the same emotional 
meanings in wartime England as Thomas Ashe’s death had done in revo-
lutionary Ireland. In England, pacifi sts were cast as cowards, not heroes. 
In 1918, a conscientious objector named William Edward Burns passed 
away in Hull Prison after a bout of force-feeding. An inquiry was overseen 
by prominent surgeon and bacteriologist, William Watson Cheyne, and 
Guy’s Hospital physician Maurice Craig. Notably, Craig had been called 
upon by the Home Offi ce during the trial of  Leigh v Gladstone where 
he had openly supported the offi cial line on ‘artifi cial feeding’ as safe, 
necessary, and therapeutic. 18 His appointment at this inquiry was hardly 
impartial. At the inquiry, it transpired that William had gone on hun-
ger strike to protest against receiving inadequate medical attention and to 
obtain a transfer (by weakening himself) to a nearby nursing home. The 
prison doctor, Dr Howlett, admitted that he had noted Burns’ anaemic 
appearance but had decided that all conscientious objectors suffered from 
the condition. ‘They are anaemic in their brains’, he caustically added. 
Howlett admitted that William had regularly complained to him about 
his weak legs and general physical debility. 19 Yet Howlett had considered 
William’s leg refl exes to be normal. Defending his decision to intercept a 
letter sent by Burns’ to his wife, the prison governor insisted that William 
had made exaggerated claims about his poor health, adding that letters 
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were not allowed to leave the prison that might alarm relatives and friends. 
Accordingly, the governor had ordered William to re-write his letter to 
provide a more accurate account about his health. At this point, William 
bemoaned that he was falling to pieces. 
 As a last resort, William went on hunger strike. During the force- 
feedings that ensued, William does not appear to have resisted the stom-
ach tube, although he did audaciously question whether Howlett had the 
permission of the Home Secretary. William was fed two pints of milk and 
cocoa through a stomach tube. During his second feeding, he began to 
spasm, splutter, and regurgitate his food. After the prisoner had settled 
down, Howlett continued his work. The following morning, William 
awoke with an alarmingly high temperature of 101  ° F and a sharp pain 
in his side. Fearing that William had contracted pneumonia, Howlett 
removed William to a hospital cell and continued to force-feed him twice 
a day until he eventually died. The inquiry brought to light the fact that 
Howlett had never performed force-feeding before. Cheyne remained 
somewhat sceptical of Howlett’s suggestion that the ‘blood-stained frothy 
stuff’ which Burns had coughed up was ‘the sticky stuff of pneumonia’. 
Instead, he suggested, Howlett had noted globules of milk that, due to 
the excessive quantity of food being inserted into the stomach tube, had 
remained in William’s lungs for a number of days. 20 Notwithstanding 
this suggestion, Craig and Cheyne concurred that William had died from 
pneumonia, a condition worsened by inhaling fl uid food while being fed. 
No blame was attributed to Howlett. 21 In the House of Commons, Home 
Secretary George Cave reported that artifi cial feeding had been necessary 
and that William’s death could not be attributed to a lack of care or skill 
on the part of the medical offi cer. 22 
 William’s plight highlights the anger felt by medical staff towards pris-
oners who challenged the state during wartime, the consequences being a 
lack of therapeutic care and an eagerness to infl ict violence. Not even death 
could bring out remorse or compassion from the military doctors who 
force-fed. Howlett was too antagonistic to William’s steadfast belief in the 
futility of war. Ironically, in rejecting international violence, William found 
himself subject to state-supported violence. In the context of war, it seems 
likely that Howlett used force-feeding primarily to discipline and pun-
ish. It also seems probable that Emmanuel Ribeiro and Clarence Henry 
Norman experienced force-feeding as a coercive accompaniment to a 
retributive system in which sovereign power was articulated through beat-
ings, restraint, and bodily intrusion. In the First World War,  force- feeding 
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was used as part of a broader military complex which discouraged political 
dissent. Hunger strikers encountered inexperienced doctors and belliger-
ent lieutenants who shared an agenda of helping to secure military victory. 
This over-ruled any moral objections which doctors might have other-
wise had towards feeding pacifi st prisoners against their will. Staff working 
within the military machine were undeniably aligned to the state, per-
haps more so than prison doctors employed during the suffragette hunger 
strike campaign. They used force-feeding to violently punish those who 
failed to share their views on the need to support the national war effort. 
 TWENTIETH-CENTURY PEACE MOVEMENTS AND HUNGER 
STRIKING 
 During war, governments are able to support methods of dealing with 
its opponents that would normally clash with accepted ethical behaviour. 
Employing prison doctors to force-feed is one example of how control is 
regained over the bodies of those who threaten state objectives. However 
politicised prisoners rarely forget their institutional experiences. They 
communicate their prison encounters in a range of narrative forms, most 
notably autobiography. Often, they bring to light occurrences that passed 
unnoticed until censorship is lifted. After the First World War ended, 
conscientious objectors initiated a robust campaign for prison reform. 
Leading members of the movement were articulate and determined, and 
they felt impassioned by their wartime incarceration. It is also likely that 
the unfamiliarity of conscientious objector prisoners to the normally secre-
tive world of the prison enhanced the sense of revulsion felt towards insti-
tutional conditions. In the 1920s, peace advocates were well placed to act 
as spokesmen for convict prisoners; a group who tended not to possess 
the means or ability to convey details of English prison conditions to the 
general public. Most notably, Stephen Hobhouse was invited by prom-
inent social reformer, Beatrice Webb, to lead a Prison System Enquiry 
Committee that included Lord Olivier, the former governor of Jamaica, 
and George Bernard Shaw. The results were published in the comprehen-
sive  English Prisons Today in 1922. 23 They initiated a wave of prison reform 
that has continued to this day. 
 Calls for prison reform were buttressed by emotive texts and pamphlets 
penned by former conscientious objectors. Since the late nineteenth cen-
tury, middle-class individuals such as the anonymous author of  Five Years 
Penal Servitude (1893) had penned memoirs that called attention to 
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institutional problems that would have otherwise gone unnoticed. 24 In the 
interwar period, conscientious objectors embraced this tradition by pen-
ning a considerable amount of autobiographical literature that highlighted 
the physical and psychological experiences of wartime imprisonment. In 
his  Prisoners of Hope , published in 1918, Charles S. Peake claimed that, 
while imprisoned, prisoners of conscience had fatally contracted pneu-
monia, been removed to lunatic asylums despite being mentally sound, 
died from severe malnutrition and, in some instances, committed sui-
cide. 25 Hunger striking and force-feeding loomed large in their accounts. 
The ongoing incarceration of conscientious objectors long after the end 
of war retained a prominent place in memories of war. In March 1919, 
Colonel Wedgewood rallied in the House of Commons against the ongo-
ing imprisonment of conscientious objectors and excessive use of force- 
feeding, lamenting that ‘we are now forcibly-feeding more men in prison 
than were forcibly-fed during the whole of the women’s agitation and 
when it is realised that these people are being unjustly kept in prison, that 
we should have that aggravated by forcible-feeding seems to me to be an 
atrocious commentary upon the administration of the criminal law in this 
country.’ 26 Richard Michael Fox was among the conscientious objectors 
who took part in the mass hunger strikes of 1919. In his  Drifting Men 
of 1930, published by Leonard and Virginia Woolf, Fox recollected his 
experiences as follows:
 They were lined up and put one by one in a big chair where burly men in 
white overalls gripped their arms and legs, forcing their heads back. Each 
man had a wooden gag jammed roughly in his mouth. Through a hole 
in this a long rubber tube was worked down his throat. Every choking, 
suffocating breath only drew the tube further down till, with a sickening 
sensation, it reached the stomach. Milk food was then poured in through a 
funnel. A hunger striker from Wigan commented with grim humour, “well 
I’ve heard o’ food queues, but this is the fi rst time I’ve ever heard of a 
feeding queue!”. One man, looking very ill, his face greenish-white, was 
being pushed round the exercise yard by the two guards. As he fainted and 
collapsed he was picked up by his head, lifted to his feet and gently urged 
on. It was all done so deliberately, so quietly and so decorously. He was not 
allowed to rest for a moment. Hunger strikers were immediately moved 
into the dungeons—dirty, dark, half-underground cells calculated to induce 
depression and increase mental torture. 27 
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 Fox added that:
 Forcible-feeding, with its assault on personality—the white-smocked doc-
tor, his uniformed assistants, his paraphernalia of rubber tube, gag and fun-
nel, all mobilised to defeat the will of the prisoner—is a horrible business. I 
do not think there are many prisoners who have entered on a hunger strike, 
who would not prefer to starve to death rather than submit to this mauling, 
especially as after the fi rst two days the ravenous desire for food vanishes. By 
staking their lives on the issue, the hunger strikers helped to force an inquiry 
into the conduct of the prison. 28 
 Although it actively campaigned for prison reform, the pacifi st move-
ment was unable to end prison force-feeding. Throughout the Cold War, 
peace protestors continued to challenge the government by staging hunger 
strikes. In 1959, John Francis Otter and Philip Cook, members of the Direct 
Action Committee against Nuclear War, went on hunger strike in Norwich 
while imprisoned for protesting outside a rocket site at Swaffham. 29 In 1962, 
Committee of Hundred members, Helen Allegranza, staged a forty-eight-
hour fast in Holloway to remonstrate against Britain’s resumption of nuclear 
tests. 30 In the same year, senior aircraftman, Brian McGee, disobeyed mili-
tary instructions in sympathy with the campaign for nuclear disarmament. 
He found himself imprisoned at the Colchester Military Corrective Training 
Establishment where he also went on hunger strike. 31 
 Many Cold War peace protestors were force-fed. Their relatively high 
public profi le ensured that their protests attracted media interest. Pacifi sts 
still formed part of a broader supportive community who could draw 
attention to matters such as unfavourable prison treatment. Perhaps, the 
most prominent anti-nuclear war protestor to go on hunger strike was 
Pat Arrowsmith. Pat was an educated middle-class peace campaigner who 
ultimately served eleven prison sentences for her political activities and 
even took the British government to court for alleged breaches of human 
rights. In 1961, Pat refused food in Gateside Prison, Greenock, to pro-
test against being made to sew canvas bags intended for use as sandbags. 
Prison doctors force-fed Pat four times. Pat resolutely believed in non- 
violent resistance and decided not to physically resist her doctors. The 
 Daily Express reported Pat’s mother to have said ‘I have telephoned the 
prison and sent her a verbal message that this action of hers is foolish and 
oversteps the mark. If she was forced to make bullets I would have every 
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sympathy for her but in the circumstances I think she is going too far.’ 32 
Pat resumed eating after four days. In the House of Commons, Labour 
politician, Emrys Hughes, pointed out that force-feeding had been per-
formed before the prisoner had displayed any signs of health deterioration 
from hunger. ‘Is he [John Maclay, Secretary of State for Scotland] aware 
that there are still in this country suffragettes who recall with horror expe-
riences of this kind in prison?’, Hughes asserted, ‘is it not time that he 
took a defi nite line to stop this?’ 33 
 It later transpired that sewing sandbags had not actually been com-
pulsory, although Pat later claimed that prison staff had failed to clarify 
this while she was hunger striking. In  The Guardian , Labour politician, 
Judith Hart, asserted that the Scottish Home Department’s ‘insistence 
that the tube-feeding to which Miss Arrowsmith was subjected was ‘arti-
fi cial feeding’ and not ‘forcible feeding’ is absurd; it is only because Miss 
Arrowsmith did not resist that the feeding was not ‘forcible’. 34 Emrys 
Hughes also wrote to  The Guardian querying why prison doctors had 
felt a need to feed Pat ‘artifi cially’ before her hunger strike had started to 
endanger her health? Refuting suggestions that force-feeding was not a 
violent act when performed on a compliant patient, Hughes retorted ‘but 
it does not follow from this that, while she was waiting for this twice-a- 
day operation in the solitude of her cell, she did not suffer considerable 
strain and mental suffering knowing what was to come. Your view of this 
of course depends on what end of the rubber tube you are.’ 35 Adding to 
the debate, Owen Staley suggested that Pat’s force-feeding was an effort 
to break the emotional will of a courageous, principled woman. 36 Not 
all letters published in  The Guardian were entirely supportive. One read: 
‘Even the most convinced pacifi st must admit that a sandbag, in so far 
as it is a military weapon, is a very inoffensive one. Many a life has been 
saved by a sandbag but I never heard of one being taken by it.’ 37 Yet most 
contributors took issue with the seemingly excessive punitive techniques 
being deployed in English prisons to tackle individuals whose ideas ran 
against the grain of contemporary public thought on war and peace. 
 In 1971, Pat refl ected on her experiences of being force-fed in  The 
Guardian . She recalled:
 I decided to go on hunger strike because prisoners were being made to work 
on sandbags and CND was then campaigning against civil defence. I wanted 
to take some action and what else can you do but refuse to eat? To begin 
with I got a spell of solitary ‘for inciting a riot’ which is rather funny for a 
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pacifi st: no books except the Bible and that’s quite a subversive book. For 
the fi rst few days they just let me alone. The screws were quite nice. They’d 
come and chat me up. They were troubled about my not eating. Then a 
lady doctor appeared, a rather pinched sort of woman, and said “come now, 
can’t go on like this”. I’d already decided I’d better agree with whatever was 
said so I made agreeing noises. She said at the end of fi ve days with no food 
I couldn’t be thinking clearly and I said “yes, yes, quite likely”. “You need 
help”, she said. “My help”, she said. Next, I was visited by a psychiatrist and 
had to talk about myself for half an hour, which is always gratifying. He tried 
to make out that I was muddled but he couldn’t do much really. He was a 
member of Scottish CND himself. 
 Pat recounted that she was later visited by a second psychiatrist, once 
journalists began to cover the story. ‘They had to cover themselves’, Pat 
claimed, ‘to see if I was going bonkers or not. Actually going without 
food was quite disagreeable; I like my food and all the things I’d ever read 
about hunger turned out to be wrong.’ For Pat, the most traumatic aspect 
of being force-fed was waiting for the footsteps of the doctors in the cor-
ridor leading to her cell. Pat contrasted her experiences to earlier groups 
such as the suffragettes. As she suggested:
 The suffragettes, for instance, weren’t [pacifi sts]; they had to resist, bite 
and spit and that makes things much worse … They push this tube down 
your throat to your stomach, you soon get a sore throat, and pour in stuff 
like Benger’s Food. The worst part is when they pull it up again. It’s like 
vomiting and sometimes I did vomit. If you won’t co-operate, they put it 
through your nose and that is very painful. And I think I’d have been much 
more frightened if I’d known then what I know now, that there’s a fair 
chance of pushing the tube through from the oesophagus into the windpipe 
and killing you … No one was particularly malevolent. Even the doctor said, 
“I’m not employed to do this, I’m supposed to cure people” and there was 
certainly relief all round when they had orders to stop. 38 
 The force-feeding of politicised prisoners always served a political 
purpose; it helped to quell dissidence. Yet, as Pat’s statements suggest, 
performing force-feeding on the body of a pacifi st evoked a particular 
sense that excessive violence was being perpetrated on an individual with 
no aggressive intentions. The act seemed all the more belligerent when 
the state authorised its use on individuals with peaceful motivations for 
hunger striking. What seems clear is that force-feeding continued to be 
deployed in England as a weapon for tackling political dissidence at times 
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of international crisis throughout the twentieth century. Indeed, war and 
confl ict continued to provide discourses that helped to justify the use of 
force- feeding, even as punishment. During the First World War, imprisoned 
conscientious objectors were fed against their will despite an awareness 
that force-feeding could kill if performed carelessly. Wartime exigencies 
increased the levels of violence infl icted on prisoner groups deemed as 
enemies of the state and its military aims. Prison doctors and military staff 
treated conscientious objectors with contempt and disdain. Their scorn 
was refl ected in deep levels of violence that marred prison experiences, 
including death, viscious beatings, prolonged feedings, and tubes being 
inserted so brutally that prisoners bled through their mouths. Politicised 
prisoners have complex interactions with the state. Convict prisoners tend 
not to have offended the state, other than having committed disruptive 
criminal acts. However pacifi sts actively oppose the state. The brutal treat-
ment of conscientious objectors and peace protestors represented an over- 
exertion of the power of a state intent on preserving national security, even 
if this did involve infl icting physical and emotional harm. 
 WARTIME IRISH HUNGER STRIKES 
 It is worth briefl y outlining the contrasting manner by which the Irish 
state tackled its wartime hunger strikers in the absence of a force-feeding 
policy. The partition of Ireland remained a divisive issue long after the 
Irish Civil War. In the 1920s, the Cumann na nGaedheal government 
consolidated the new Irish state. 39 A relatively small number of anti-Treaty 
IRA members remained determined to re-unite the island. Éamon de 
Valera’s Fianna Fáil government, which came into power in 1932, ini-
tially acted congenially towards the IRA. Indeed, de Valera himself had 
been a key revolutionary fi gure. Upon coming to power as Taoiseach, 
he legalised the IRA and freed republican prisoners interned under the 
Cumann na nGaedhael administration. Yet tensions mounted through-
out the 1930s. In 1936, de Valera outlawed the IRA after a controversial 
series of murders and shootings. 40 Hostility peaked during the Emergency 
(the term used for the Second World War in neutral Ireland). Irish public 
feeling towards the IRA was mixed. Given that many of its members had 
fought valiantly for the cause of independence just two decades earlier, a 
degree of sympathy existed. Nonetheless, the IRA stepped up its violence 
as the Second World War commenced, incurring governmental wrath. 41 
The onset of war coincided with a renewed period of republican violence 
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in both Britain and Ireland. Major British cities were bombed. Fianna 
Fáil implemented emergency legislation to tackle political subversion, the 
most penetrative of which was the Offences Against the State Act (1939). 
This established special criminal courts and increased garda (the Irish 
police force) power to prevent seditious activities. The Emergency Powers 
Amendment Act (1940) conferred additional powers, including extended 
powers to use capital punishment. 42 Fianna Fáil justifi ed these security 
policies by warning that the IRA was likely to collude with Nazi Germany, 
disrupt Anglo-Irish relations, and disturb Irish efforts to remain neutral. 43 
 Like many wartime leaders, de Valera used imprisonment extensively to 
quell political opposition. Like the conscientious objectors before them, 
IRA members protested by hunger striking in a climate of media censorship, 
and heightened public concern about political dissidence. Furthermore, 
de Valera was anxious to maintain good relations with the wartime British 
government, encouraging him to pursue ruthless strategies of neutralis-
ing militant republicanism. 44 In September 1939, de Valera appointed 
Gerald Boland as Minister of Justice, an IRA veteran who was steadfastly 
loyal to the Taoiseach and who took a hard-line stance against militant 
republicanism. After being swiftly rounded up and detained, a number of 
imprisoned republicans decided to refuse food. De Valera sternly warned 
that he would not grant concessions. The prisoners, de Valera insisted 
were pursuing a violent, subversive path against the wishes and desires of 
the Irish population. He mournfully added that responsibility for a prison 
death would rest solely with the hunger strikers themselves and not with a 
government who refused to give in to unreasonable demands. 45 De Valera 
depicted the starvation of a hunger striker as a self-imposed, if undesirable, 
tragedy; as a consequence of the irrational behaviour of politically subver-
sive individuals. War allowed him to do so. National security was central to 
de Valera’s rhetoric. Yet under the layers of compassion that permeated de 
Valera’s announcement rested a crucial opportunity to permanently deal 
with a violent, subversive group. 
 The imprisonment of republicans fi ghting for the moral cause of a 
united Ireland stimulated mixed emotions. Hunger striking was deeply 
entrenched in the Irish psyche as a morally just action, a last resort against 
political injustice. The strong republican credentials of many of the protes-
tors presented an irreconcilable ideological quandary. In October 1939, 
Con Lehane, a solicitor and later co-founder of republican political party 
Clann na Poblachta, went on the fi rst reported hunger and thirst strike of 
the Emergency to protest against his detainment at Arbour Hill military 
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prison. 46 Labour politician, William Norton, sardonically asked Boland 
in the Dáil: ‘am I to understand that hunger strikes or thirst strikes of 
this nature which were right in 1922 and 1923 are wrong in 1939?’ 47 
Norton’s shrewd comment pointed to the deeply embedded positioning 
of hunger striking in the Irish national psyche. Despite endorsing some 
releases, de Valera maintained that he was still willing to let hunger strik-
ers die if necessary. In November, eminent republican and prisoner rights 
campaigner, Madam Maude Gonne MacBride, wrote to the President 
of Ireland, Douglas Hyde, pleading with him to intervene in a hunger 
strike being staged by Patrick McGrath. As part of her impassioned appeal, 
MacBride reminded Hyde that Patrick still had an English bullet lodged 
in his chest received during the Easter Rising. The bullet had lodged too 
close to the heart to allow for safe surgical removal. MacBride also pointed 
out that Patrick had fought valiantly in the War of Independence. She 
emotively warned that ‘if one of them is allowed to die it will create a bit-
terness which nothing will be able to repair and we have had bitterness 
enough in our country since 1921.’ 48 Nonetheless, de Valera remained 
fi rm despite the crisis of conscience produced by the idea of allowing an 
eminent former comrade to die. 49 Ultimately, the hunger strikers were 
released and conveyed to a nearby nursing home. 50 
 Patrick’s premature released was a victory for Irish republicanism. 
Nonetheless, it ultimately had lasting implications for the IRA.  On 23 
December 1939, fi fty IRA members raided the Irish army’s ammunition 
store in the Magazine Fort, Phoenix Park, stealing over a million rounds 
of ammunition. The raid heightened public concern about IRA activ-
ity, clashing as it did with the broader context of international confl ict. 
After the raid, garda offi cers arrested and detained a number of individu-
als. Patrick McGrath was one of the arrested men, causing de Valera to 
regret his earlier decision to release hunger strikers. 51 Indeed, he faced 
severe criticism in the Dáil for having given way earlier to McGrath’s pro-
test. 52 From hereon, de Valera refused to succumb to further pressure to 
authorise the release of hunger strikers. The raid also prompted Boland to 
swiftly implement the amended Emergency Powers Act. 
 As Eunan O’Halpin suggests, hunger strikes now stopped being an 
effective means of extracting concessions. What followed was a purposeful 
wartime clampdown on political subversion. 53 In February 1940, Anthony 
D’Arcy, Seán ‘Jack’ McNeela, Tomas MacCurtain, Michael Traynor, 
Thomas Grogan, Jack Plunkett, and John Lyons went on hunger strike at 
Arbour Hill Internment Camp. 54 The prisoners declared that, in the event 
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of a death, successive prisoner groups would pursue hunger strikes and 
take up the fi ght. 55 Michael Traynor later recalled that ‘day followed day. I 
cannot remember any particular incident, except that regularly three times 
a day an orderly arrived with our food, which we of course refused to take. 
We were by now nursing our strength realising that this was a grim strug-
gle, a struggle to the death. We jokingly made forecasts of who would be 
the fi rst to die.’ Notably, Michael recounted that the prison medical staff, 
as is often the case in incidences of prison self-starvation, remained mostly 
sympathetic and accorded the protestors kind, humane treatment. 56 
 Jack Plunkett was the brother of Joseph Plunkett, one of the executed 
leaders of the Easter Rising. In March 1940, his mother, Josephine 
Mary, wrote to Cardinal Joseph McRory pleading for his intervention. 
She steeped her letter with allegations of rampant immorality in convict 
prisons. Republican prisoners, she claimed, including a young seventeen-
year- old, were imprisoned in Mountjoy alongside sexual degenerates, a 
tacit reference to the potential exposure of prisoners to homosexuality. 57 
Maud Gonne MacBride also wrote to McRory. As an active campaigner 
for improvement in Irish prison conditions, she framed her letter in terms 
of the cruelty of prison life and the harsh, demeaning rules in place that 
structured prison life. She claimed that ‘non-recognition of political status 
leads to endless trouble, confusion and often to tragedy.’ To fortify her 
point, she wrote:
 So we have men like Jack Plunkett—whose family, God knows, have made 
sacrifi ces for Ireland which should have spared them this new torment—on 
hunger strike for sixteen days and people wondering how long they will 
last … none of these distressing things would have occurred if the prison 
code laid down recognition for political status. Is it necessary that another 
prisoner should die or another prisoner have to be transferred to a lunatic 
asylum before the prison code is altered to recognise political status? 58 
 Nonetheless, sympathy towards the hunger strikers remained confi ned 
mostly to committed republicans. While the Lord Mayor of Dublin, Caitlin 
Bean ní Cléirigh, publicly conceded in March that ‘it is sad to think that the 
brother of Joseph Plunkett is on hunger strike at Arbour Hill while prepa-
rations are being made to honour the memory of the Easter week leaders,’ 
he added that ‘it is sadder still to think that the uprising of 1916 against 
a foreign enemy should be so distorted as to be used as an excuse for 
condoning armed attacks on our people.’ While acknowledging Plunkett’s 
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irrefutable republican credentials, ní Cléirigh portrayed the remaining IRA 
as a group of individuals who misunderstood the true nature of the War 
of Independence and the Civil War. 59 Ultimately, the dilemma of allowing 
hunger strikers to starve even despite their close connections to national 
heroes of an earlier generation failed to weaken de Valera’s resolve. While 
removing a small group of prisoners from prison to an internment camp 
appeared, on the surface, to be a somewhat trifl ing demand, the symbolic 
implications of acknowledging the IRA’s political and military status, forti-
fi ed with concern that further IRA internees might stage protests, remained 
omnipresent. In this instance, the state fi rmly maintained its sovereign right 
to maintain control over the prison environment. Moreover, the death of a 
hunger striker would present a stark warning to other potential protestors 
that national security interests needed to take precedence over IRA deaths 
for the foreseeable future. 
 When two deaths did occur, the attitudes of even hard-liners such as 
ní Cléirigh softened. On 16 April 1940, Anthony D’Arcy died following 
fi fty-two days on hunger strike. Throughout his protest, Anthony had 
refused medical examination. At a subsequent inquest, ex-IRA Chief of 
Staff and lawyer Seán MacBride (and son of Maud Gonne MacBride) 
addressed the jury stating that individuals convicted for political reasons 
should be awarded political status. He accused the government of inhu-
manity and intolerance. 60 The verdict read ‘exhaustion from want of nour-
ishment’, although the jury recommended that action should be taken in 
relation to other hunger strikers. 61 In the face of sharp criticism, de Valera 
re-reiterated that hunger strikers could not dictate government policy. 62 
Three days after Anthony’s death (and four hours after the protest had 
been called off), Jack McNeela died after a fi fty-fi ve day hunger strike. 
Jack was the nephew of Fianna Fáil TD Michael Kilroy. 63 At the inquest 
that followed, Seán MacBride charged Boland with responsibility for the 
unnecessary deaths of two republican men. 64 
 Whereas the death of Terence MacSweeney and others had caused inter-
national outrage and elicited considerable sympathy for the cause of full 
Irish autonomy, Emergency-period hunger strikes took place in an envi-
ronment that lacked overwhelming support for IRA violence and where 
partition had been gradually, sometimes reluctantly, accepted. Notably, 
although D’Arcy’s death received media coverage in both Ireland and 
England, the  Daily Mirror speculated that ‘Dublin, with the exception 
of the small IRA following, appears unmoved by the news of D’Arcy’s 
death.’ 65 If accurately reported, this situation compared unfavourably with 
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earlier incidences of death from hunger strike. In the 1940s, prisoners 
were not dying in support of the Irish nation, they died because they 
opposed it. As John Maguire suggests, de Valera was essentially the fi rst 
politician to successfully undermine the power of the hunger strike as a 
weapon of political confrontation. 66 
 Emergency-period hunger strikes were limited in scope and failed to 
elicit political change. Faced with a government resolutely opposed to 
conceding to IRA demands, prisoners and internees realised the futility of 
starving themselves and, for the most part, refrained from hunger striking 
following the deaths of Anthony D’Arcy and Jack McNeela. When hunger 
strikes did take place, the IRA struggled to amass public support or main-
tain group cohesion while in prison. Public enthusiasm for an internal war 
against the Irish and Northern Irish states remained limited, a backdrop 
that did little to boost morale in the prison. When assessed in terms of 
their political effectiveness, the protests had limited impact. Indeed, de 
Valera’s determinedness not to concede to prisoner demands can be con-
ceived as a Fianna Fáil victory. In many ways, this scenario compares to the 
outcome of the conscientious objector hunger strikes pursued in the First 
World War, protests that aroused some degree of humanitarian sympathy 
towards the plight of prisoners but ultimately failed to attract new recruits. 
Indeed, the British government, like de Valera’s wartime government, 
successfully re-asserted its authority in maintaining civil order against a 
backdrop of international crisis. 
 Nonetheless, imprisoned republicans did help to draw public attention 
to the adverse prison conditions which they encountered. Upon release, 
they conveyed evocative details of alleged institutional brutality and vio-
lence. Their experiences unintentionally helped to shape a broader dis-
cussion of institutional conditions in both Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
Former IRA Chief-of-Staff, Seán McCaughey, went on hunger strike in 
April 1946 at Portlaoise Prison. Four years earlier, Seán had been sen-
tenced to death for assaulting Stephen Hayes, ex-Chief of Staff of the IRA 
and an alleged gardaí informer. Seán’s sentence was subsequently com-
muted to life. Notably, Seán went on hunger strike to protest against the 
brutal and inhumane institutional conditions in which he resided. After 
sixteen days of refusing food, he refrained from drinking. Seán died on the 
twenty-third day of his hunger strike (and eighth day of his hunger and 
thirst strike). In May 1946, the Republican Prisoners’ Release Association 
passed a resolution expressing ‘the horror and  detestation of the inhuman 
treatment of Seán MacCaughey’ and demanding ‘the immediate ending 
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of the torture of his comrades’. Con Lehane claimed that McCaughey 
had been ‘driven to death by inhuman conditions in Portlaoise Prison’ 
and described the prisoner as the thirteenth victim of de Valera’s prison 
system. 67 
 A jury returned a verdict of death caused by heart failure brought on 
by inanition and dehydration caused by a lack of food and fl uid intake. 
Importantly, the inquest provided Seán MacBride with an important 
opportunity to initiate a discussion of Irish prison conditions. 68 Macbride 
brought to the witness stand a sense of emotion and drama that the pub-
lic could identify with. During the proceedings, he brought to light the 
fact that Seán McCaughey had not been allowed outside into the fresh 
air or sunlight during four years of imprisonment. In consequence, Seán 
had suffered numerous nervous breakdowns. When asked by MacBride, 
‘If you had a dog, would you treat it in that fashion?’, Dr Duane, after 
a brief pause, reluctantly replied ‘no’. MacBride concluded his scathing 
indictment of Seán’s imprisonment by asserting, ‘my submission is that 
the treatment meted out to this man was responsible for his death in this 
place called a prison, which is a hell’. 69 The jury concurred, stating that 
‘the conditions existing in the prison were not all that could be desired 
according to evidence furnished.’ 70 Following the inquest, an anonymous 
letter sent to de Valera on the subject of Seán’s death compared Irish 
prison conditions to the barbarity of Russian institutions. Moreover, alle-
gations of prison brutality provided a platform upon which to campaign 
for the release of other interned prisoners, most notably the son of Tómas 
MacCurtain (the murdered Lord Mayor of Cork who had preceded 
Terence MacSweeney in the position). 71 
 McCaughey’s death reinvigorated public interest in prisons. Angered by 
Seán’s plight, in May 1946, the Farmers Party and the Labour Party called 
for an inquiry into conditions at Portlaoise, although this was defeated. 
Seanad Éireann passed a motion calling for an inquiry. A subsequent 
report condemned prison conditions, devoting a dedicated section to the 
plight of political prisoners who appeared to have been treated particu-
larly harshly. The fi ndings of the report formed the basis of Labour Party 
prison policies from the late 1940s. Between 1946 and 1947, a number 
of administrative changes were made aimed at improving material condi-
tions in Irish penal institutions. These included an increase in the number 
of visits, extended privileges, improved diet, more appropriate recreation 
facilities, and a general trend towards rehabilitation rather than reform. 72 
Indeed, following the McCaughey revelations, serious efforts were made 
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to improve conditions in institutions such as Portlaoise which witnessed 
a dramatic improvement in prison conditions and in areas such as prison 
diet. 73 Perhaps more signifi cantly, the death of Seán McCaughey served as 
a springboard for the various disparate political elements that would even-
tually coalesce around MacBride and his call for the formation of a new 
constitutional republican political platform. In 1948, Clann na Poblachta 
replaced Fianna Fáil in power. 74 
 Notably, Seán McCaughey’s prison death coincided with a hunger strike 
initiated in Belfast Prison by David Fleming whose plight aroused similar 
concerns about Northern Irish prison conditions. In 1944, twenty-eight 
prisoners, led by former IRA Chief of Staff Hugh McAteer, went on hun-
ger strike in Belfast Jail to protest against poor quality food and unhealthy 
conditions. Force-feeding was not performed as the prison governor and 
the Minister of Home Affairs chose to ignore the protest. 75 Yet David 
Fleming was force-fed in 1946. He also claimed to have suffered violent 
manhandling during the procedure. 76 Notably, David went on hunger 
strike in response to alleged brutality and victimisation by prison staff, not 
to secure political status or release. He was subject to brutal beatings. On 
one occasion, so much of his blood splattered over the cell walls that they 
needed to be whitewashed. 77 In 1946, David staged two hunger strikes. 
The fi rst lasted for eighty-two days; the second for forty-eight. During his 
fi rst hunger strike, David was force-fed for fi ve days, although the prison 
doctors were unable to pursue this treatment for longer as David was 
prone to violently attacking them. 78 After his last assault on the prison 
doctor, David found himself placed in a padded cell. Minister of Home 
Affairs Edmond Warnock brought in a psychiatric specialist to assess 
David’s mental health. The specialist found no reason to diagnose the 
prisoner as mentally unstable. Warnock invoked the diagnostically vague 
term ‘religious mania’. However, Fleming’s hunger strike was too pur-
poseful for a convincing claim of insanity to be formed. 79 Given a tendency 
of prison medical staff to proclaim hunger strikers as mentally unsound, 
Warnock’s efforts can be interpreted as an attempt to permanently remove 
a troublesome politicised prisoner from the institution. Towards the end 
of his second protest, David was released and transported in a weak, ema-
ciated condition to Pembroke Nursing Home, Dublin, a journey of over 
hundred miles. 80 Despite having been ordered not to return to Belfast, 
David was apprehended in September 1947 at Nutts Corner Airport, 
Belfast, after arriving from Dublin in an Aer Lingus plane. He then went 
on a further hunger strike. 81 
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 David’s experiences can be situated in a broader context of discussion 
about Northern Irish prison conditions. Two years earlier, questions had 
been raised in the House of Stormont about whether prisoners were hun-
ger striking in Belfast Prison to protest against harsh, humiliating insti-
tutional conditions. 82 Labour Party MP, Jack Beattie, had claimed that 
prisoners were being regularly subjected to unnecessary cell searches and 
strippings, as well as indecent searching by the warders who accompanied 
their intrusive cavity inspections with verbal abuse and insults. Beattie also 
pointed out that politically motivated prisoners were being placed in cells 
where they were forced to associate with individuals committed for sexual 
crimes, to listen ‘to their fi lthy and degrading talk’. In addition, Beattie 
claimed that food rations fell far below the authorised allowance. It was 
also badly cooked and served on unwashed plates. Milk was watered-down 
and cocoa served in tins containing remnants of turnips and vegetables. 
Beattie insisted that ‘Northern Ireland is the only place in the world where 
you fi nd cruelty existing to the extent that I outlined.’ He concluded 
his powerful indictment by announcing ‘we are more akin to the Nazis 
in Germany than we are to the democratic world outside it’, adding his 
intention to appeal to the American Red Cross and the Council of Civil 
Liberties. 83 
 Although Stormont MPs paid scant attention to the political dimen-
sions of David Fleming’s hunger strike, a number of them expressed 
concern over his motivations for hunger striking; rooted as they were 
in broader questions about prison conditions. Fleming’s protest raised 
important questions about the extent to which imprisonment—with its 
monotony, loss of individuality, and endless punishment—truly reformed 
or aimlessly punished. In the House of Stormont, Mr Healy suggested 
that ‘the present [prison] buildings ought to be blasted to the ground’ 
and called for a public inquiry into the state of Northern Irish prisons. 
Healey emotively concluded by pleading:
 I ask you, if you have any humane instincts left in you, not to look on this 
from a prejudiced point of view. Think of this boy Fleming being brought 
into his cell by four or fi ve warders and there beaten. His skull was crashed 
in and he was left lying for hours with blood fl owing from his head. Is it 
any wonder that to-day he is on hunger strike? Is it any wonder that previ-
ous to that he acted in an irrational manner? Surely if we are not blinded by 
prejudice and carried away with political sentiment, the time has come when 
matters should be looked into and an impartial inquiry held. 84 
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 It seems evident that Irish republicans were treated with undue harshness 
and violence while imprisoned during the Emergency and Second World 
War. War justifi ed their detainment and encouraged hostility between staff 
and prisoners. The context of war also allowed politicians, including de 
Valera, to support actions that would normally be deemed harsh, includ-
ing letting a number of hunger strikers die. His strategy was successful 
in terms of quelling hunger strikes but raised broader humanitarian con-
cerns. Yet, as is often the case when wartime prisoners are treated harshly, 
prisoners amassed considerable public attention when news of the violence 
infl icted upon them reached beyond the prison walls, in this instance, rais-
ing calls for prison reform. 
 CONCLUSION 
 During wartime, politicised prisoners often pursue activities that seem 
to threaten the integrity of the state. They find themselves exposed to 
imprisonment and a relative lack of public sympathy in their plight. A 
need to protect national security interests justifies particularly brutal 
methods of force-feeding or, in some instances, a willingness to let 
starvation run its natural course. Censorship and appeals made to the 
over-riding concern of securing military victory ensure that the fate 
of politicised hunger strikers remains mostly hidden from public view. 
Nonetheless, politicised prisoners are often adept at drawing attention 
to the harsh conditions in which they reside, either through their sup-
portive political network or through their own subsequent writings. 
This produces a mixed emotional response. While public support for 
conscientious objection or IRA activity was minimal in the contexts 
discussed in this chapter, the idea that suffering was being inflicted 
upon individuals forced to live in inhumane conditions clashed with 
public sensibilities on how humans should be treated. The prisoners 
had suffered enough by being isolated from society. Was it really nec-
essary to beat, punish, and brutally force-feed them? In many ways, 
wartime hunger strikers are relatively powerless in comparison to their 
peacetime counter-parts. They feel the weight of sovereign power 
working against them due to the additional powers conferred on 
wartime governments. But paradoxically, it is these groups of hunger 
strikers that historically made the most inroads into campaigning for 
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institutional reform. The harsh treatment meted out to them remained 
vivid in their memories, encouraging participation in prisoner welfare 
movements. Perhaps the greatest achievements of the hunger strikers 
analysed in this chapter was their ability to raise a broader set of ques-
tions about the milieu of prison life, even if their disparate political 
aspirations ultimately failed. 
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